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This paper looks at sui generis rights claimed for the protection of folklore. Since rights should not be 
created in any which way if one is to avoid privileges and rent-seeking, it is important to be clear about 
design constraints stemming from such rights being species of property rights, adapted to deal with the 
particular  content  of  information  structures  that  need  special  encouragement  or  protection. 
Examination of the logic of property rights in general and of intellectual property rights in particular 
reveals  that  intellectual  property  rights  are  sought  because  of  their  decentralised  incentive  and 
information effects, but that they need to be circumscribed because of the monopolistic effects they 
entail. The trouble with monopoly is that whilst it is in place, one does not realise the creativity that is 
prevented from emerging. All intellectual property rights reflect compromises of these contradictory 
tendencies and as a result, more and stronger intellectual property rights are not necessarily better from 
a general welfare point of view. 
 
The forms of sui generis rights proposed for folklore appear modelled on copyright, but with the 
removal  of  several  key  features  that  define  the  equilibrium  inherent  in  copyright:  no  originality 
requirement; no known creation date or creators; indefinite duration. Folklore kept secret is altogether 
taken out of commerce. As a result, these rights strike a balance very much more to the monopoly side 
of  the  spectrum  than  do  existing  intellectual  property  rights  and  hence  risk  severely  constraining 
creativity. This may seem like an acceptable constraint given the objective of preservation, but one 
must realise that it will affect the future carriers of the protected information. Faced with severe 
restrictions on ways they can improve their lives within the protected setting, they may well opt for the 
exit option and head for greener pastures. This would severely strain efforts to preserve whatever the 
sui generis rights aim to protect. Information lock-up may not be the most promising formula for 
preservation. 
 
Mots clés : Property rights, intellectual property, copyright, sui generis rights, 
folklore. 
                                                 
* Contribution to Sui Generis Rechte zum Schutz von Folklore, Göttingen, Universitätsverlag (Forthcoming). 
† Fellow, CIRANO; Emeritus Professor of Law, Université de Montréal, ejan.mackaay@umontreal.ca   
CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 2 
I    PROPERTY RIGHTS – GENERAL LOGIC ....................................................... 3 
A  Property and scarcity ................................................................................................... 3 
B  Conditions and effects of property rights ..................................................................... 4 
C  Emergence and forms of property rights ..................................................................... 6 
II    INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ............................................................ 8 
A  What is peculiar about information? ............................................................................ 8 
B  Incentives for creating information ............................................................................. 10 
C  Intellectual property rights in practice ........................................................................ 14 
III    FOLKLORE AND ITS PROTECTION ............................................................ 18 
A  Inapplicability of existing intellectual property rights .................................................. 18 
B  A look at proposals for sui generis rights ................................................................... 19 
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 21 
REFERENCES  ..................................................................................................... 22 
   EJAN MACKAAY – SUI GENERIS RIGHTS  2 
 
Introduction 
Folklore is one form of cultural expression for which currently new ways of 
legal protection are being sought. In earlier contributions, the Göttingen Cultural 
Property  Research  Team  have  addressed  the  questions  of  what  constitutes 
cultural expression or property writ large and why it may need special protection.
1 
One contribution argues for protection only where the identity of the carriers of the 
cultural expression is at stake.
2  Various means of protection have been examined, 
some  legal, some non-legal, some  already available, others  needing  yet  to be 
articulated and enforced as legal institutions: regulation of use, trade, import and 
export;  certification  and  licensing;  intellectual  property  rights;  geographical 
indicators  and  other  collective  trade -marks;  subsidies  or  tax  advantages; 
nationalisation.
3 
This  paper focuses specifically on sui generis rights as  a  means of legal 
protection  for  folklore.  Folklore,  in  the  understanding  of  the  WIPO 
Intergovernmental  Committee  of  i ntellectual  property  and  genetic  resources, 
traditional knowledge and folklore, in 2011, refers to: 
(a)  phonetic or verbal expressions, such as stories, epics, legends, 
poetry, riddles and other narratives; words, [signs,] names, [and symbols]; 
(b)  [musical  or  sound  expressions,  such  as  songs,  [rhythms,]  and 
instrumental music, the sounds which are the expression of rituals;] 
(c)  expressions by action, such as dances, plays, ceremonies, rituals, 
rituals in sacred places and peregrinations, [sports and [traditional]] games, puppet 
performances, and other performances, whether fixed or unfixed; 
(d)  tangible  ex pressions,  such  as  material  expressions  of  art, 
[handicrafts,]  [works of  mas,]  [architecture,]  and  tangible  [spiritual  forms],  and 
sacred places.
4 
The protection claimed by various groups advocating it aims mostly at use of 
folklore outside of its traditional context. 
The term sui generis rights is used here to designate legal institutions that are 
similar to intellectual property rights but do not fit within the mould of the existing 
rights of patent, copyright and trade-mark. The term came into vogue to designate 
the special data base protection rights instituted by the European Union in 1996.
5   
Advocating sui generis rights   for folklore  raises the question of   why the 
                                            
1    Bendix 2010.   
2    Bicskei 2010. 
3    Mackaay 2010, at 265.   
4    See WIPO 2011, art. 1. 
5    Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council  of 11 March 1996 on the 
legal protection of databases, OJEC of 27/3/1996, L77/20.   EJAN MACKAAY – SUI GENERIS RIGHTS  3 
existing  intellectual  property  rights  do  not  work.  Whatever  the  answer,  if  one 
accepts that protection by other means is needed, a second issue arises, namely 
that of constraints on the design. Rights cannot be fashioned in any which way if 
we are to avoid granting privileges, which create rents for particular groups and 
needlessly  curtail  the  functioning  of  market  processes,  as  opposed  to  property 
rights,  which  are  the  very  foundation  of  market  processes.  Privileges  are 
unsustainable  in  open  market  processes.  Intellectual  property  rights  borrow  the 
essence  of  the  logic  of  property  rights,  whilst  at  the  same  time  adjusting  it  to 
accommodate their specific object, which are information structures. Adaptations of 
general property rights logic need not go against the grain of market processes. 
Other  such  adaptations  have  occurred  elsewhere:  shares  in  commercial 
enterprises;  tradable  rights  in  objects  that  will  become  available  in  the  future 
("futures"); tradable pollution permits or landing rights, to name just a few.   
In what follows, we summarise the logic of property rights as it has evolved 
for tangibles and has been clarified in the economic literature over the past half-
century.
6   This  should  explain  why  an  institution  discovered  by  our  distant 
ancestors is still useful in modern society, whose economic and social organisation 
is vastly more complex. We then look at the specific adaptations required to make 
this logic applicable to the intangible content of intellectual property rights.  This 
prepares the scene for a discussion of why these structures appear not to work for 
folklore and the merits of proposals for sui generis rights. 
I    Property rights – general logic
7 
A    Property and scarcity 
1  PROPERTY RIGHTS ARE A RESPONSE TO EMERGING SCARCITY 
Property rights in tangibles are a response to scarcity. The need to establish 
them will be perceived when a resource that was previously abundant becomes 
scarce because new uses for it are discovered and start to compete with known 
uses. Emergent scarcity manifests itself in disputes and even conflict over who can 
use what, when multiple uses are no longer simultaneously possible. One solution 
is to fight it out with the winner taking all. But this is not a recipe for improving the 
welfare of society as a whole, or indeed for lifting oneself out of the subsistence 
cycle. History teaches that a  more promising formula is to attribute the right to 
decide what shall be done with the newly scarce resource to a single person or 
group, to the exclusion of others, and to attach to it the right to trade it to someone 
else:  property  rights  in  the  broadest  (economic)  sense.  Paradoxically,  by  lifting 
scarce  resources  out  of  open  accessibility,  one  ends  up  making  them  more 
                                            
6    See for instance Alchian 1973; Barzel 1997; Anderson 2003; Colombatto 2004; Bizer 2010. 
7    See further Mackaay 2006, 2008, forthcoming.   EJAN MACKAAY – SUI GENERIS RIGHTS  4 
available.  Furthermore,  by  establishing  clearly  who  is  responsible  for  what, 
property rights tend to prevent or soothe conflict; they are "pacifying". 
2  NO SCARCE OBJECT WILL BE LEFT IN OPEN ACCESS  
The corollary of the first principle is that no scarce resource will be left in open 
access. Resources in open access will tend to be over-consumed and, where their 
availability  requires  human  effort,  under-produced.  Resources  that  do  not  lend 
themselves  to  the  establishment  of  property  rights,  as  in  the  case  of  flowing 
unpolluted water, clean air or fish in open sea, may of necessity have to be left in 
open access. They will tend to demonstrate the deleterious effects of open access 
to resources that are really scarce: overfishing or pollution of the water and air. Of 
course, we can appeal to people’s sense of responsibility or more forcefully, adopt 
rules to curtail consumption, but the logic of the situation is such that all persons, 
while paying lip service to the common weal, will be tempted secretly to pursue 
their  private  interest  and  consume  more.  Since  all  face  the  same  incentives, 
collective  ruin  ensues.  This  development  is  known  by  the  name  of  a  scenario 
described by Hardin: the tragedy of the commons.
8   
B    Conditions and effects of property rights 
3  PROPERTY RIGHTS REQUIRE A MINIMUM OF EXCLUSIVITY TO WORK 
Property rights are viable only in as much as use of the scarce object can 
effectively be reserved to the person or group designated as owners. For many 
objects this is unproblematic. You keep an eye on the food you just bought to eat; 
you keep your living quarters under lock. How serious you are about locking up 
depends on who you feel might be tempted to take things from you; in remote 
areas where you know all your neighbours, you may not need to lock up at all.   
For some objects – open air and water were mentioned – it is difficult, with 
technology now known to us, to reserve use to particular persons. Here we face 
the problems of open access just alluded to. 
We need to be more precise about what is to be reserved to owners. The 
viability of property rights depends on ways in which owners can effectively get 
their hands on the fruits flowing from the use of the scarce commodity. It will be 
helpful  to  use  the  term  fences  for a  variety  of  devices  and  institutions  used  to 
accomplish  this.  Fences  can  be  physical  stops  such  as  wooden  fences,  walls, 
hedges or ditches. The effect of fences may be dramatic: the invention of barbed 
wire allowed cattle to be bred in the American West on far smaller areas of land 
than before. The quality of the fencing technique deployed may change the viable 
uses  of  property.  Fences  can  take  many  other  forms  as  well:  guard  dogs  and 
physical surveillance; tagging of animals in free roaming herds. Vending machines 
act  as  fences.  The  GPS  system  permitting  instantaneously  to  locate  cars 
contributes  to  fencing  them  in  against  theft.  Doctors,  lawyers  and  other 
                                            
8    Hardin 1968. As a historical description this is no doubt inaccurate - see Ostrom 1990.   EJAN MACKAAY – SUI GENERIS RIGHTS  5 
professionals provide information only to paying customers (unless they work pro 
deo), thereby solving the fencing problem, as do most performing artists charging 
for attending their live performances. 
The cost of the fencing technique is part of the cost of using the property. As 
the former go up in relation to the latter, it may no longer be worthwhile to use a 
prevailing  fencing  technique,  and  one  may  have  to  resort  to  a  simpler  one  (or 
invent a new one) and tolerate some slippage or lower quality use. In cinemas, 
seats are no longer individually assigned; each viewer finds a seat on a first come, 
first serve basis. But for theatre, concerts and opera, individually assigned seats – 
and the ushers to guide you to them – are still viable given the higher ticket prices.   
Salt  and  pepper,  once  very  dear  commodities,  are  no  longer  individually 
rationed in restaurants, but provided free with any meal. This exemplifies a formula 
we encounter often in the world of intellectual property. Where it is not profitable to 
fence in an object by itself, the owner may yet succeed in getting paid for its use by 
tying it to a different commodity or combining it into a more expensive package – 
as in buffet style meals – which can be profitably fenced in. To put this differently, if 
a fencing technique no longer works so well, don’t condemn property but change 
your business plan to collect revenue differently. The film industry thus discovered 
that they could make more money from home viewing, initially regarded as piracy, 
than from cinema viewing, if they sold videos at $20 (rather than at $100, as they 
first tried). Alternatively, go for a new and cheaper fencing technique. Fences are 
themselves economic goods, subject to innovation and trade. 
Fences need not be fool proof; some pilferage can be tolerated so long as the 
owner  can  draw  enough  use  or  revenue  from  the  fenced-in  object.  House 
ownership does not become unviable because of the risk of a break-in; it might, 
though, in areas exposed to repeated looting. 
4  PROPERTY  RIGHTS  ARE  DECENTRALISED  AND  CREATE  INCENTIVE  AND 
INFORMATION EFFECTS 
￿With property rights, owners decide what shall be done with the property but 
also harvest the fruits of their decision or suffer the losses from sloth or misguided 
decisions. These features were already known in Roman law as usus and fructus. 
Combining  them  in  one  hand  creates  a  feedback  loop  providing  immediate, 
automatic and decentralised information on the quality of management decisions. 
Property rights give owners the incentive to manage wisely what they currently own 
(incentive  effect),  by  comparing  prospective  returns  from  different  uses  of  their 
property and choosing what looks most promising to them (information effect).   
5  TRANSFERABILITY  INCREASES  THE  INCENTIVE  AND  INFORMATION  EFFECTS  OF 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The incentive and information effects are reinforced where property rights can 
be transferred to others – abusus in Roman law. This is by no means to be taken 
for granted. Roman law took quite a while to admit the transfer of immovables (real   EJAN MACKAAY – SUI GENERIS RIGHTS  6 
estate), and initially only with cumbersome formalities. The possibility of transfer 
allows non-owners, as it were, to look over the shoulder of the current owner to see 
if they can imagine a more profitable use and if so, propose to buy the object from 
the latter. This extends the range of possible uses being compared. Where transfer 
takes place,  it  tends to  move  resources to higher-valued  uses,  which  improves 
overall welfare.   
Easy transferability of resources gives rise to markets, which in turn triggers 
the development of money as an open-ended means for storing value. Money will 
lead  resources  traded  in  the  market  to  be  priced  and  this  further  facilitates 
comparing different options for what may be done with scarce resources. 
Taken together, these features of property rights explain why they play such a 
central role in the social organisation of developed societies and indeed why they 
may be considered an essential condition for economic development.
9 
C    Emergence and forms of property rights 
6  PROPERTY RIGHTS CAN ARISE BY PRIVATE INITIATIVE 
Property rights as we know them are usually formalised in legislation. This 
does not mean that they must of necessity be created by legislation at the outset. 
Where a person can establish control over some scarce resource using means 
already owned, i.e. that are "part of the property order", that person has the usus 
and  fructus  components  of  a  property  right.  If  the  legal  system  does  not  put 
restrictions on contracts that may be entered into, that person can agree with third 
persons on conditions for the latter to have access to the resource. Part of these 
conditions could be a clause obliging the third person to impose similar conditions 
on further persons to whom the resource might be transferred (as was customary 
in software licences). This simulates a crude form of "abusus".   
The system can operate with mere background support from public authority 
enforcing public order, perhaps more explicitly only where "leakage" (third persons 
being  given  unauthorised  access)  needs  to  be  curtailed  through  forms  of  civil 
liability  (tort)  law.  Private  actors  can  accordingly  experiment  the  viability  and 
usefulness of such prototype property rights. Public authority can in due course 
consolidate these efforts in the form of legislation or case law, which regularises 
them and makes enforcement easier.   
Such  a  "discovery  process"  would  seem  to  have  been  at  work  in  the 
development of private enterprise (company) law, trade-mark law, plant-breeder's 
law in France
10  and surely others. One might sum  it up as control + freedom of  
contract (+ court help with leakage control) = prototype property right. This insight 
is helpful for getting a grip on how the property rights logic may be extended to new 
objects that might seem at first blush not to be readily amenable to it, as in rights to 
landing slots at busy airports, tradable pollution permits and so on. 
                                            
9    Amongst many: North 1973; Acemoglu 2005; Angeles 2011. 
10    The story is told in detail in Hermitte 1988.   EJAN MACKAAY – SUI GENERIS RIGHTS  7 
7  COMMON  PROPERTY  MAY  APPEAR  WHERE  EXCLUSIVITY  IS  PROBLEMATIC  OR 
DISADVANTAGEOUS 
￿Not all commodities subject to property rights are individually owned. Some 
are  owned  by  groups  or  communities.  In  a  classical  study  on  Governing  the 
Commons,  which  has  earned  her  the  Nobel  prize  in  2009,  Elinor  Ostrom  has 
shown that common ownership  is not an anomaly but  is widely  practised in all 
regions of the world, for instance amongst farmers letting their cattle freely roam in 
the  high  Alps  and  in  shared  fishing  waters.
11  Nearer  to  us,  condominia  are 
examples. 
Why is this, since surely decision-making by an individual would normally be 
easier than by a group? One set of circumstances where common property may be 
preferable to individual property have to do with the cost of fencing. Where, as in 
fishing grounds, it is difficult to allocate specific chunks of  a common resource to 
individuals, though it is feasible to reserve the resource (such as fishing grounds) 
to  the  group  as  a  whole  as  against  outsiders,  common  property  may  be 
preferable.
12  Economists then speak of club goods. 
To avoid a slide into a tragedy of the commons for common property, a set of 
rules for the governance amongst group members has to be put in place. They 
determine under what circumstances community members may use the common 
resource.  The  simplest  rule  is  equal  access  for  all,  but  many  other  rules  are 
conceivable. The  limits  of use  will be  set  so  as  to  avoid  exhaustion of  what  is 
scarce  in  the  resource  held  in  common.  The  rules  will  have  to  provide  for 
supervision and for sanctions against those who transgress the rules, ranging from 
disapproval to exclusion, blacklisting, flaming and worse. Further rules will have to 
specify under what conditions  new persons are admitted to the community and 
under which they can exit. Finally, rules will have to be set for collective decision-
making concerning a change of the rules or the use of the common property. 
A different form of cost of access is at stake in the creation of share spaces: 
open content,
13  creative commons,
14  community enterprises
15  and indeed sharing 
of ideas within the scientific community, through SSRN and similar venues.  Even 
industrial development of new products benefits from share spaces,  if Saxenian is 
right.
16  Here the cost of gaining access where exclusive rights are being exercised 
is thought to interfere with the rapid reciprocal stimulation of participants in creative 
work. Knowledge and cu lture, as we shall argue, tend to be cumulative: every 
addition builds on earlier ones; creativity will be facilitated by easy access to earlier 
work.   
A third argument for common property, as some  argue, is that open sharing 
                                            
11    See Ostrom 1990. 
12    For a comparison between individual and common property rights, see Rose 2002. 
13    For a recent summary, see Lerner 2010. 
14    See for instance Lessig 2004; Elkin-Koren 2005; Dusolier 2006. 
15    Frey 2011 
16    Saxenian 1994, 2006 ; see also Benkler 2005.   EJAN MACKAAY – SUI GENERIS RIGHTS  8 
within a community is essential for creating and maintaining community spirit. 
8  OBJECTS DECLARED OUT OF COMMERCE
17 
In  most  countries,  some  objects  are  declared  out  of  commerce,  though 
(property) rights may well exist on them. They may not be traded. The right to bring 
up a child cannot be traded; in many countries one cannot sell one's organs and in 
some neither can one sell one's own blood.   
Economic analysis has identified three kinds of reasons invoked in support of 
such  prohibition:  self-paternalism,  pure  or  "hard"  paternalism  and  externalities. 
Self-paternalism refers to restrictions rational persons would, in their self-interest, 
impose on their own behaviour for times when they were less lucid. In  My Fair 
Lady, Alfie Doolittle, set to engage in a last bout of drinking and frolicking on the 
eve of his wedding, beseeches his mates to stop him at whatever he will be doing 
so  as  to  "get  me  to  the  church  in  time".  Hard  paternalism  refers  to  restrictions 
imposed  on  persons  because  others  consider  the  pursuit  of  their  preferences 
socially unacceptable. This form of paternalism imposes the preferences of one 
group  of  citizens  on  others.  Externalities  refer  to  restrictions  imposed  on  one 
person's  actions  because  of  negative  effects  on  the  life  or  livelihood  of  others, 
which are not properly taken into consideration in the decision to undertake those 
actions. It reflects a fundamental tenet of liberalism that one's liberty can stretch 
only so far as is compatible with equal liberty of others. Public authority may be 
used  to  prevent  a  person  from  inflicting  harm  onto  others.
18  Of  these  three 
justifications, pure paternalism is clearly the most difficult to justify morally. 
The prohibition of trading particular objects,  implying their removal from the 
official market, literally deprives them of a price. Yet their scarcity is by no means 
diminished and hence shortages may develop. This in turn may give rise to a black 
market.
19 
II    Intellectual property rights 
Intellectual  property  rights  are  adaptations  of  the  property  rights  logic  to 
specific  kinds of  information  structures. To  get  a  handle on  the  challenges  this 
poses, we start by looking at some general features of information. This will lead us 
into the specifics of the adaptations that intellectual property rights represent. 
A    What is peculiar about information? 
1  INFORMATION IS EVERYWHERE 
In  its  broadest  sense,  information  is  the  basic  ingredient  of  all  human 
decision-making.  You  are  informed  if  you  learn  something  you  did  not  already 
                                            
17    See Mackaay 2008, 239 f. 
18    Mill 1859/1991, 14. 
19    Mackaay 2008, 167 f. Mackaay forthcoming, chapter on the black market.   EJAN MACKAAY – SUI GENERIS RIGHTS  9 
know; otherwise, what you learn is redundant. What you learn may help you make 
decisions more confidently or differently.   
Information is everywhere. We express our thoughts by means of information 
structures such as natural language and specialised languages for different fields 
of  knowledge,  craft  or  trade;  our  culture  is  one  complex  set  of  information 
structures; so is scientific knowledge or news published in a variety of ways. Much 
of  this  information  is  generated  almost  unwittingly,  as  a  by-product  of  daily 
activities undertaken for other purposes, and does not appear to require special 
encouragement to be undertaken. Whatever is generated automatically appears to 
be abundant in the sense that there will be enough for everyone, however it is 
used, and it can be left to flow freely. 
2  MOST INFORMATION  CAN BE REPRODUCED AT EVER LOWER COST AND CAN BE 
USED BY MANY PERSONS AT ONCE AND REPEATEDLY 
Technological advances, in particular the digitalisation of just about any form 
of  information  known  to  humankind,  make  it  ever  easier  to  reproduce  and 
disseminate  information.  The  cost  of  both  is  coming  down  continually.  Most 
information can be used by many persons at once without its utility to any one of 
them  being  diminished.  The  exceptions  are  forms  like  secrets  or  advance 
knowledge (such as is used in insider dealing): holders of information benefit from 
being in the know before the world at large is. But these are the exceptions – in 
most circumstances, information looks economically like a public good: its use is 
non-rival; exclusion is problematic. 
Unlike tangibles, most information can be used repeatedly without wearing 
out.  Think  merely  of  reading,  arithmetic,  writing  skills.  Information  may  become 
obsolete and be discarded when newer information replaces it. Our arithmetic skills 
may go that way as a result of the advent calculators and computers; dictation 
software may put our writing skills under strain.  In neither case, however, have 
these skills worn out. Where information can be used repeatedly, it is like a capital 
good in economic terms, which increases the effort and cost one will be prepared 
to expend to acquire it. 
3  MOST  INFORMATION  IS  CUMULATIVE:  NEW  INFORMATION  IS  CREATED  USING 
OLDER FORMS 
An invention or creation is rarely produced ex nihilo. It is almost always based 
on already known information structures. Every existing invention or creation can 
thus be the springboard for new ones. This is referred to as follow-on innovation. 
New discoveries in science are glimpsed “by standing on the shoulders of giants.”
20 
In technology, the cumulative effect is evident in the concern to make systems 
interoperable  and  compatible,  in  the  quest  for  shared  standards,
21  and in the 
                                            
20    Echoed in the title of Scotchmer 1991. See also   
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desire to ensure that essential facilities are accessible.
22  Human progress is by 
nature cumulative.   
In order to foster the accumulation of k nowledge, we need to give future 
creators access to existing creations. Any increase in the cost of access to existing 
creations tends to reduce follow-on innovation; lasting monopolisation of existing 
creations would seriously hamper the overall creativity of a society in the long term. 
We should expect the accumulation of knowledge to be an essential consideration 
in the design of the institutions for stimulating creativity and inventiveness.   
4  SOME INFORMATION REQUIRES SPECIAL EFFORT TO BE GENERATED 
Some information clearly would not be forthcoming without special effort by 
particular  persons  to  create  it:  books,  lists  of  addresses,  artwork,  musical 
comedies,  architectural  drawings,  scientific  discoveries,  technological  advances, 
etc. Such creations are scarce in a sense, but the scarcity is not located in the 
object created. The scarcity lies in the creative talent that must be devoted to the 
creation of these objects. To draw the creative talent into this special effort may 
require specific incentives.   
The need for specific incentives – to direct creative talent towards one type of 
creation rather than others – will be perceived as increasingly pressing as, thanks 
to  mass  production  and  advances  in  distribution  technology  such  as  printing 
presses and industrial production, the fruit of creativity and inventiveness can be 
made available and shared with a great many persons, much beyond those whom 
the  creators  know  personally.  If  part  of  the  benefits  that  all  the  beneficiaries 
experience thanks to the creation could be gathered and used to lure the creators, 
the incentive would be much more powerful than what the creators could make 
from their own work and personal contacts alone. It thus becomes useful to look for 
institutions that can “concentrate” incentives for creators to engage in creation and 
invention for the benefit of the community. The advantage to the community lies in 
the  fact  that  everyone  will  have  access  to  and  be  able  to  use  the  creations 
relatively easily, in comparison with a situation in which creators keep their secrets 
to themselves. 
B    Incentives for creating information 
1  INCENTIVE STRUCTURES – HISTORICALLY 
The ubiquity of information and its mostly unwitting creation  militates for a 
base rule of letting information flow freely, which is indeed the one observed in the 
legal  systems  of  developed  nations.  The  cumulative  character  of  information  is 
helped where persons can rip-mix-burn unhampered. The public good character of 
information  suggests  that  government  may  consider  itself  obliged  to  step  in  to 
stimulate its creation, an investment all the more worthwhile as the information can 
be used repeatedly. Perhaps, to take just one example, public schools teaching the 
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three  r's  (reading-writing-arithmetic)  to  all  comers  could  be  justified  this  way, 
although it must be noted that most parents already perceive that need for their 
offspring independently.
23 
Where special effort is required to create information, in many cases it may 
be called forth by the prospect of  increased revenue the creators can draw from 
deploying the information in their daily activities or trade, or from  their having a 
head start in bringing objects incorporating  it to market (first mover advantage). 
Many past advances in agriculture and handicraft may be due to this logic. For a 
long time violin builders kept their trade knowledge secret so that they could earn 
money on it through the sale of their special instruments. They would pass the 
knowledge and skills on to their offspring. Effective as this approach may be for 
capitalising on knowledge, it has the disadvantage of not sharing knowledge widely 
and runs the risk of knowledge disappearing where it cannot be passed on. 
For this reason, other procedures, involving sharing of knowledge, have been 
tried: grants, scholarships, sponsoring, pensions and annuities, lotteries, awards, 
prizes,  medals  and  other  honours,  tax  incentives,  monopolies,  procurement 
contracts (for military inventions in particular) and intellectual property. 
If we knew precisely what we wanted to develop and who could do it, we 
might well be indifferent amongst these various means of encouraging creativity. 
You contract with a builder to erect the house of your dreams precisely as you 
want and specify it. If we had all that information, a central planner could bring 
about the right kind and amount of creativity for a society. For military innovation, 
one can sometimes proceed that way.   
In  most  circumstances,  however,  we  do  not  have  that  information  and 
discover things "on the go". We did not, for instance, know that the system of easy 
communication  amongst  scientists  had  the  potential  to  become  the  worldwide 
universal communication system that the internet now is. We did not know that it 
would be profitable to put all communicable information in numerical form. Rather, 
these discoveries were most fortunate side-benefits made available to us because 
our  discovery  processes  are  largely  decentralised  and  open-ended,  and 
serendipity can play its part. The most valuable creativity for society is perhaps the 
kind for which it is by and large uncertain where it will take us, and which involves 
entrepreneurial gambles.   
2  DESIGN CONSTRAINTS FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
We are therefore looking for open-ended institutions creating decentralised 
incentives. Putting it this way immediately points to the property rights logic. But 
property rights require exclusivity to function and this interferes with the free flow of 
information, which as we saw is the base rule in most legal systems, and with the 
cumulative character of knowledge. Furthermore, information does not lend itself 
easily to exclusivity and so legal help may be required to make that happen. This 
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means  that  the  law  has  to  be  pressed  into  service  to  create  a monopoly  –  an 
uncomfortable situation at best. If the property rights logic is to be deployed for 
setting up decentralised special incentives for creativity, the law will have to back it 
up by enforcing some monopoly power, but this monopoly power will of necessity, 
given the nature of information, have to be circumscribed.   
From this a fundamental principle follows: All intellectual property rights are a 
compromise. They are, on one hand, species of property rights sought for their 
incentive and information effects and decentralised character, but, on the other, are 
tempered to circumscribe the monopoly effect they inevitably require. These rights 
should be framed so as to generate the minimum incentive desired, but reach their 
limit  where  their  cost in  terms of  reduced potential for follow-on creation  would 
surpass the benefit of that incentive.   
Overstretching  intellectual  property  rights  is  likely  to  produce  the  perverse 
effects of monopoly generally. To illustrate what this means, consider the story of 
the Bell telephone empire in North America. Up until the early 1970s, telephone 
services were considered a natural monopoly, and throughout North America were 
offered by companies belonging to the Bell Empire (AT&T). The companies were 
private but their rates were subject to government regulation. Public wisdom had it 
that  regulation  would  allow  the  companies  to  make  reasonable  returns  on 
investments but prevent them from exploiting their monopoly to the detriment of 
telephone users. At the time, the North American telephone industry prided itself 
on offering consumers the best telephone system in the world at the lowest prices. 
Bell  Laboratories  made  fundamental  discoveries  that  regularly  won  prestigious 
awards.
24   
What about consumers? Virtually the only model they could rent was the 
black rotary telephone, admittedly indestructible. If they wanted a white phone or 
one with buttons, they had to pay extra. Telephones could be installed only by Bell 
technicians.   
By the mid-1970s, a timid experiment was conducted in the United States: the 
“interconnect” market of devices that could be hooked up to the telephone network 
was “freed.” The effect was immediate and dramatic: there was a proliferation of 
new devices and new functions. Within a few years, a wave of innovation spread 
across the entire developed world. Since then, deregulation has extended to most 
areas  of  telephone  service  worldwide.  Quite  possibly  the  internet  and  mobile 
telephony would not have emerged, or at least would not have grown so quickly, 
had the monopoly not been broken. In this case, as elsewhere, competition has 
turned out to be a powerful discovery procedure.
25   
If we may extrapolate from this, the lesson for intellectual property seems 
clear: a state  run monopoly does not prevent invention, but it redirects  creativity 
towards creations and inventions that serve the purposes of their creators, for 
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example,  the  Bell  Laboratories  researchers,  but  that  do  not  necessarily  benefit 
consumers. The problem is that the delay caused by monopolies is visible only 
retrospectively.   
While the monopoly is in place we will not become aware of the creativity of 
which we are depriving ourselves. If legislation creates intellectual property rights 
that lead to too strong a monopoly, it can divert creativity away from what is most 
desired by consumers and towards what best suits industry. It will not be easy to 
measure the creativity that has been prevented from emerging.
26  This perverse 
effect may occur even though consumers continue to purchase large quantities of 
the product in question (such as rotary telephones).   
Home video recording (on videocassettes), file sharing by Na pster, Kazaa, 
Grokster, Gnutella, Morpheus, and other forms of P2P communication were all 
originally considered simple pirating tools, to be eradicated. Were they perhaps 
indicators  of  consumer  preferences?  In  the  third  millennium,  do  we  need  to 
interpret open content software and creative commons in the same vein? Whatever 
the answer, given the impossibility of directly calculating the effects of overly strong 
monopolies, we can at least describe the scenarios of perverse effects that should 
be suspected.
27   
The foregoing considerations have led researchers to postulate a n inverted 
U-shaped relationship between the scope of intellectual rights and  the increase in 
general welfare, as mediated by the level of innovation. The scope of the right is 
reflected in four dimensions: the objects it cover s; the conditions for obtaining it 
and the potential title holders; the practices it allows the holder to prohibit and the 
sanctions available to back up that prohibition; the term of the right.   
Diagram  1  Relationship  between  the  strength  of  intellectual  property 
and the increase of general welfare (as mediated by the level of innovation)
28   
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In the absence of formal protection of intellectual property, interested persons 
can still secure their creation by keeping it secret and insisting on confidentiality 
agreements when giving access to it. So the left hand side of the graph does not 
start at the horizontal axis. When formal protection is weak, strengthening it should 
have the effect of improving overall creativity in society.
29  Beyond a certain point, 
however, strengthening it further will reduce overall creativity as the monopolising 
effect  of  the  rights  crowds  out  follow -on  innovation.  If  this  relationship  is  as 
hypothesised  a further founding principle   follows:  More  or  stronger  intellectual 
rights are not necessarily better from the perspective of general welfare.   
C    Intellectual property rights in practice 
3  CONSTRAINTS BUILT INTO IP LEGISLATION 
Too  strong  intellectual  property  rights  create  monopoly  effects.  Monopoly 
effects might be controlled through competition law (antitrust law in the US), but 
this is a crude tool that should perhaps be left as a means of last resort. Better to 
build anti-monopoly restrictions into the laws that define intellectual property rights. 
Upon  closer  inspection,  most  restrictions  of  copyright  and  patent,  the  main 
intellectual  property  rights,  make  sense  from  the  perspective  of  curtailing  the 
monopoly power these rights inevitably confer. Let us consider each of the four 
dimensions briefly. 
As  regards  the  subject  matter  of  patent  or  copyright,  both  rights  exclude 
general theories, pure ideas and abstract formulas. The contrary position might 
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lock  up  foundational  information  and  unduly  interfere  with  follow-on  innovation. 
Moreover, both rights can be granted only for specific crystallisations of new ideas, 
which  patent  law  captures  through  the  requirement  of  practical  or  industrial 
application, copyright through that of fixation in a tangible support. 
Both patent and copyright set conditions for obtaining the right. For copyright, 
the  creation  must  be  original  (which  at  the  very  least  implies  a  personal 
contribution  of  the  creator,  beyond  mere  reliance  on  or  copying  of  existing 
creations), but no formal request has to be made. For patent, a formal request is 
required and it must reveal the specific invention for which the right is claimed; that 
invention must be both objectively novel and not obvious to a person skilled in the 
particular field. Here again one can spot the desire to encourage the creator at the 
same time as that to avoid too easy interference with follow-on creation. In both 
cases, it is the creator who gets the right initially and, in the case of patent, who 
alone is entitled to put in the initial claim for it. 
Copyright protects, as the name suggests, against direct copying, which has 
been  extended  to  translations,  adaptations  (a  novel  into  a  film  scenario,  for 
instance), communications to the public and, somewhat uneasily, to forms of non-
literal copying. It covers the original work as well as adaptations and translations. 
Against infringers, a range of measures can be applied including court orders to 
stop infringing, seizure of infringing copies, accounting for illicit profits, damages 
etc. Patent ranges even wider, covering any application of the protected invention 
by whatever name and in whatever form. Similarly, severe sanctions are available 
against  infringement.  To  temper  its  monopolistic  effect,  copyright  law  exempts 
certain activities from control by the copyright holder. In the US, these exemptions 
are known as "fair use", in Commonwealth countries as "fair dealing". 
Both rights are restricted in time. Patent, being the widest ranging right,  is 
restricted to 20 years from the request for the right. Copyright was initially, in the 
British legislation of 1710,
30  granted for 14 years, but has been extended over the 
centuries to reach lifetime plus 50 or even 70 years for natural persons and 95 
years for artificial ones. Whether this remarkable extension is anything else than 
rent-seeking without useful incentive effect on creation is a moot point.
31 
Together these four dimensions define the scope of the rights in legislation.  
The different dimensions are to an extent substitutes: as we just saw, a very broad 
right, as patent is in object and  range of protection, calls for a r elatively short 
protection period, as against copyright, which is more restricted in what it protects, 
but lasts far longer. 
4   DOUBTS ABOUT WHETHER WE HAVE GOT IT RIGHT 
Confident though we may feel that the general relationship between scope of 
intellectual property rights and creativity is as Diagram I indicates, and that this is 
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reflected in the general outlines of intellectual property legislation, we are as yet 
unable to measure the precise form of the curve and locate where the scope of 
rights established within a particular legal system locates us on the horizontal axis, 
and hence whether we are at the optimal point of the curve.   
Attempts are being made to overcome this limitation. Pollock, for instance, 
takes  a  stab  at  estimating  the  optimal  term  of  copyright  by  means  of  a  formal 
model.
32  For parameters of copyright other than duration, one could take welfare 
to be indicated  by the number of works created and make this depend on the 
stimulating effect of copyright, on one hand, and on its deadweight -loss effect (on 
follow-on creators) on the other. For the copyright term, however, a richer model is 
necessary which includes the consideration that copyright work produces welfare 
increases over time, but  that these increases decline as time goes by ("cultural 
decay"). By building in the cultural decay factor as well as a standard discount 
factor for the value of money earned in t he future, Pollock is able to estimate an 
optimal copyright term of 15 years in a steady -state model.
33  The estimate is, 
however, quite sensitive to the values of these parameters and putting them at the 
low end of the range, he arrives at an estimate of 52  years!
34  Considering these 
results, the  jury still seems to be out on how to establish the optimal scope of 
intellectual property rights. 
Our inability to "measure the curve" has serious consequences for policy 
options as regards intellectual property righ ts legislation. Consider point E1 in 
Diagram 2. If reality is as pictured by the pessimistic curve (CP  – in blue), the 
scope  of  IP  rights  has  been  extended  beyond  what  is  socially  optimal;  further 
increasing it to point E2 would lead to welfare (innovation) loss. Restricting the 
scope of intellectual property rights (moving it to the left of E1 in the Diagram), 
making more work ineligible for it and hence relegating it to the public domain, 
would enhance economic welfare. By contrast, if reality is as the optimists would 
have it (the CO curve – in red), increasing the scope of intellectual property from 
E1 to E2 would lead to a welfare improvement.   
Diagram 2 Optimistic and pessimistic views of the relationship between 
the strength of intellectual property and the increase of general welfare (as 
mediated by the level of innovation) 
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5  FURTHER DOUBTS: INDUSTRIES GETTING BY WITH LITTLE OR NO IP 
Doubts  about  whether  current  intellectual  property  rights  are  optimal,  or 
indeed necessary at all, stem also from the observation that important industries 
and services get by with little or no intellectual property protection at all. Cooper 
Dreyfuss  considers  this  to  be  the  case  for  "fashion,  stand-up  comedy,  magic, 
cuisine,  and  software  (consider  Linux,  Apache,  and  Firefox)".
35   Fashion,  in 
particular, is a very significant industry, taking in $750 MM yearly  worldwide, of 
which $200 MM in the US alone, more than the cultural industries combined!
36  The 
concentration in this industry is significantly lower than in the cul tural industries. It 
should be noted that, whilst the industry does not rely on protection for its designs, 
it relies heavily on trademark protection for its ware.   
For stand-up comedy, most enlightening fieldwork shows how the sector gets 
by without  intellectual property  but with  informal norms amongst participants.
37 
Saxenian has eloquently made the case that share culture – absence of exclusive 
rights,  until  the  stage  of  marketing  finished  products  –  is  highly  conducive  to 
creativity in high tech industries.
38  Frey and others have followed up on this idea in 
describing the virtues of "community enterprises" such as those producing the 
wikis.
39  In academic research, in spite of copyright on the formal journals in which 
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papers are published – called "academic tombstones" by one author
40  – the most 
up-to-date  results  of  academic  research  circulate  freely  in  the  form  of  working 
papers, with the help of organisations such as SSRN and academic repositories. 
Boldrin  and  Levine  generalise  from  these  and  other  findings  to  argue  that 
intellectual property is altogether superfluous.
41 
6  MOVES BY MARKET PARTICIPANTS TO CREATE WIDER ACCESS 
The monopolistic effects of IP rights can be curtailed by market participants 
themselves through such arrangements as cross-licensing, patent pools or clearing 
houses,  as  well  as  through  open  content  and  creative  commons  licences.
42 
Instituting such practices can be an answer to charges of anticompetitive behaviour 
by competition authorities. In terms of Diagram II,  such arrangements would tend 
to shift the effective scope of the intellectual property right away from the monopoly 
pole  of  the  spectrum .  If  intellectual  property  legislation  protects  more  than  is 
optimal, market participants have at their disposal some private actions to correct 
this (somewhat).   
III    Folklore and its protection 
A    Inapplicability of existing intellectual property rights 
As a means to protect folklore, patent law appears to be at first sight of limited 
use because of the apparent absence of industrial applicability. Notice, however, 
that the Indian government has proceeded to film and publish 1300 or so traditional 
Yoga-postures, creating what is termed a "defensive database" in recent WIPO 
documents.
43  This  would  make  them  public  knowledge  accessible  to  all  and 
prevent others from claiming a patent on them (for want of novelty). Moreover, 
such public dissemination would clearly establish the Indian origin of these cultural 
phenomena.
44 
Can copyright serve to protect folklore?  The match is problematic as well, 
though  perhaps more subtly. First, there is no clear fixation, defining on what 
protection is to be granted.
45  Furthermore, there is no clear date of creation, which 
constitutes a problem for the term of  copyright. If a right of indefinite duration is 
claimed, this goes directly against the grain of copyright as a compromise: it would 
raise fears of undue monopoly power. A third problem is the absence of known 
creators. Copyright, in the analysis presented above, serves to direct an incentive 
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to  create  upon  the  specific  person(s)  of  the  creator(s).  Related  to  this  is  the 
absence of originality  – identifiable contribution by the creator(s)  – as copyright 
requires it. One might debate, of course, whether a modified definition of originality 
stressing  the  unique  character  of  the  folklore,  its  being  unlike  other  known 
expression, might not be more appropriate, but this is not within the purview of law 
as it now stands. 
Copyright legislation acknowledges the possibility of authorship by a group of 
persons whose individual contributions in the creation cannot be distinguished. But 
the protection is still afforded to a known group of persons, on an original creation 
and for a limited time. So the creators, their contribution and the date of creation 
must be ascertainable. For folklore, these conditions are not satisfied. Copyright 
can  serve  in  a  circumscribed  role  through  the  right  it  grants  performers  in 
recordings  to  be  made  of  their  live  performances.
46  But this is of  only  limited 
interest since it  skirts the question of whether recordings should be made  in the 
first place. 
B    A look at proposals for sui generis rights 
To get a handle on what is being claimed as sui generis protection for folklore 
and  other  cultural  expression,  it  seems  appropriate  to  refer  to  draft  provisions 
circulated  in  April  2011  on  behalf  of  the  Intergovernmental  Committee  on 
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, 
of WIPO.
47   
A  preliminary  question  is  why  this  interest  in  protection  groups  holding 
traditional cultural expressions is springing up just now. Hilty suggests that it may 
well be that such groups have been able to trade their cultural objects on a 
moderate scale in the past and that, with growing globalisation, the interest for 
them  has  multiplied  and  increasingly  risks  being  exploited  by  multinational 
operators, whose wherewithal local groups cannot match and risk falling victim to:
48 
emergent scarcity, to use a term from the property rights logic. 
Amongst the aims listed  at the outset of the WIPO document, one retains 
those of allowing the relevant communities to control the use of their traditional 
cultural expressions and to prevent the misappropriation  and misuse of same as 
well as the grant, exercise and enforcement of intellectual property rights ac quired 
"by unauthorized parties" on same. 
Article 3-A mandates measures to  stop fixation, disclosure, use or other 
exploitation of secret cultural expression. 
Article 3-B reserves as collective rights to relevant groups defined in Art. 2 the 
prerogative  to  authorise  or  prohibit,  as  regards  non-secret  traditional  cultural 
expressions  "other  than  words,  signs,  names  and  symbols",  a  series  of  acts 
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including  "fixation;  reproduction;  public  performance;  translation  or  adaptation; 
making  available  or  communicating  to  the  public;  distribution".  As  regards 
traditional  cultural  expressions  which  are  words,  signs,  names  and  symbols, 
including  derivatives  thereof,  the  control  extends  to  "any  use  for  commercial 
purposes,  other  than  their  traditional  use;  acquisition  or  exercise  of  intellectual 
property rights; the offering for sale or sale of articles that are falsely represented 
as  traditional  cultural;  expressions  made  by  the  beneficiaries  as  defined  under 
Article 2; any use that disparages, offends, or falsely suggests a connection with 
the  beneficiaries  as  defined  under  Article  2  or  brings  them  into  contempt  or 
disrepute". 
Article 3-C aims to establish the right of attribution (to be recognised as the 
source of particular cultural expression), of reputation and integrity. 
Article 4 deals with the management of such rights, in particular licences to 
use  "outside  the  traditional  or  customary  context"  (art.  5).  This  power  may  be 
exercised  by  a  body  within  the  group  itself  or  by  an  outside  body,  such  as  a 
government agency. 
The right is essentially of indefinite duration (art. 6). 
This brief overview suggests that secret traditional knowledge is essentially 
declared to be out of commerce and subject to what Hilty terms "cultural privacy".
49 
On an economic analysis, privacy r ights would be regarded as non -transferable 
property rights. These rights may have some of the side effects referred to above 
for objects declared out of commerce. 
As regards the non-secret traditional expression, the provisions appear to be 
modelled on copyright law. There can be little quarrel with recognition – the moral 
right side of the proposed rights.
50  On the economic side of the right, there are  
essential differences  with copyright  in  that the  proposed  right has no term, its 
object need not be fixat ed nor be in any sense original, and licences for use 
outside the original context are to be decided upon by a collective procedure or by 
a representative state agency.  Where an outside agency  administers the use of 
cultural property, public choice leads one to expect that they will take an expansive 
view of such use wherever they can so as to justify their mandate.  Overall, these 
particular features  constitute weighty transaction costs, likely to complicate  any 
outside use contemplated.
51   
In terms of Diagram 2, the balance these sui generis rights propose to strike 
between protecting existing expression and openness to new expression appears 
to be dramatically shifted towards the monopolising side of the spectrum. Outsiders 
are to be discouraged from follow -on creation (derivatives) by heavy transaction 
costs preceding any venture.   
The painful question which this position raises is whether such an extremely 
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protective  stance  is  helpful  or  harmful  to  the  objective  of  preserving  cultural 
expression.  Is  innovation  unimportant,  given  the  overriding  concern  to  preserve 
traditional expression and lifestyle? Surely the viability of cultural expression will be 
increased if whoever uses or exploits it can expect to earn good money with it. 
Merely  earning  respect  within  the  community  may  not  be  appealing  enough. 
Creation  within  the  traditional  community  is  a  very  small  market.  Is  innovation 
outside the community going to be open to any insider or to an outside group who 
have insiders as partners? If so, there may be a rush by persons seeking to find 
ancestry within the protected cultural group. The proposals are not entirely clear 
about it, but appear to lean towards a negative answer (controlling any outside 
use).   
As regards what is authentic, the difficulty, as Zimbehl correctly points out,
52 
is who is to decide what is an authentic form , to be recognised, and whether non-
authentic forms are prohibited or merely lack recognition as authentic, but can 
otherwise  go  forward  as  innovations.  Restrictive  regimes  may  interfer e  with 
freedom to criticise older forms (and their proponents) and to experiment with new 
ones. This in turn may affect the viability of the authentic forms . Mere certification 
marks or collective trade-marks for authentic forms may be a less intrusive and  
hence less damaging form of promoting authenticity.   
Once  an  outside use is authorised,  it ought  to  be governed by ordinary 
intellectual property rights logic with the balance of incentive versus openness they 
strike. The contrary position would commit us to unnecessary information lock-up 
or to granting privileges in the use of cultural expression.   
Altogether, the adaptation the proposed sui generis rights strike with respect 
to copyright dramatically shifts the balance inherent in copyright to the side of more 
control or monopoly. Such a shift comes inevitably at the expense of openness to 
new  creation.  One  must  wonder  whether young  persons  within  the  protected 
groups, who should be future carriers of cultural expression, find these prospects 
appealing enough or whether they would be tempted to exit altogether in search of 
a better future. Even where preservation is the objective, one still needs to create a 
climate in which future generations will find it worth their while to preserve rather 
than seek salvation elsewhere. Stifling innovation will undermine this interest and 
with it the viability of preserving what is valued. Information lock-up may not be the 
most promising formula for preservation. 
Conclusion 
This paper looks at sui generis rights claimed for the protection of folklore. 
Since rights should not be created in any which way if one is to avoid privileges 
and  rent-seeking,  it  is  important  to be  clear  about design  constraints  stemming 
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from  such  rights  being  species  of  property  rights,  adapted  to  deal  with  the 
particular  content  of  information  structures  that  need  special  encouragement  or 
protection. Examination of the logic of property rights and of intellectual property 
rights  reveals  that  intellectual  property  rights  are  sought  because  of  their 
decentralised  incentive  and  information  effects,  but  that  they  need  to  be 
circumscribed  because  of  the  monopolistic  effects  they  entail.  The  trouble  with 
monopoly is that whilst it is in place, one does not realise the creativity that is 
prevented  from  emerging.  All  intellectual  property  rights  reflect  compromises  of 
these  contradictory  tendencies  and  as  a  result,  more  and  stronger  intellectual 
property rights are not necessarily better from a general welfare point of view. 
The proposed forms of sui generis rights appear modelled on copyright, but 
with  the  removal  of  several  key  features  that  define  the  equilibrium  inherent  in 
copyright: no originality requirement; no known creation date or creators; indefinite 
duration. Folklore kept secret is altogether taken out of commerce. As result, these 
rights strike a balance very much more to the monopoly side of the spectrum than 
do  existing  intellectual  property  rights  and  hence  risk  severely  constraining 
creativity.  This  may  seem  like  an  acceptable  constraint  given  the  objective  of 
preservation,  but  one  must  realise  that  it  will  affect  the  future  carriers  of  the 
protected information. Faced with severe restrictions on ways they can improve 
their lives within the protected setting, they may well opt for the exit  option and 
head for greener pastures. This would severely strain efforts to preserve whatever 
the  sui  generis  rights  aim  to  protect.  Information  lock-up  may  not  be  the  most 
promising formula for preservation. 
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